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No. 80-1199 - AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON 
Justice White, dissenting. 
Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(h), 
provides that: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to apply 
different standards of compensation, or different 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
pursuant to a · bona fide seniority or merit 
system, provided that such differences are 
not the result of an intention to discriminate 
because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, •..• " 
A plurality of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
sitting en bane, has construed the protections afforded by 
§703(h) to any seniority system instituted after 
...._______.....__.. "-- ""'-- ~ ------ - \_ -....__ -------
the effective date of Title VII. The plurality based its holding 
--------- ~ ~ 
in part on its view that the legislative history of §703(h) was 
"replete with indications" which "conclusively demonstrates that 
'• . 
-2-
Congress intended the immunity accorded seniority · systems by 
§703(h) to run only to those systems in existence at the time of 
Title VII's effective date, and of course to routine post-Act 
applications of such systems." Accordingly, the plurality held 
that post-Act seniority systems should be assessed under the test 
articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 u.s. 424 (1971), and 
not under the more relaxed standard announced in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977), 
for challenges to bona fide seniority systems adopted before the 
effective date of Title VII. Since the particular seniority 
system at question in this part of the case had already been 
found to violate Griggs, the plurality held that a Title VII 
violation had been demonstrated with respect to the particular 
seniority system at issue.l 
In my view, the Fourth Circuit has decided an important 
question of federal law which this Court should review. First, 
nothing in the language of §703(h) supports the bright-line 
distinction drawn by the court below. On its face, §703 (h) 
directs that bona fide seniority systems can only be found to 
violate Title VII if they intentionally discriminate on the basis 
1 The original panel found that the seniority system 
in question was not "bona fide," within the meaning of 
§703(h). See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 
300, 303 (CA4 1978). The plurality did not rely on this 
ground, however, but instead based its decision on the 
nonapplicability of §703(h) to seniority systems enacted 
after the effective date of Title VII. Similarly, the 
Fourth Circuit specifically refused to base its decisions on 
respondents' argument that the specific system under 
consideration was not in fact a seniority system within the 
meaning of §703(h). 634 F.2d, at 749 n.3. 
-3-
of race, sex, or other statutorily prohibited bases . . There is no 
indication in the text of the provision that Congress intended 
bona fide seniority systems imposed after the effective date of 
Title VII to be treated in a fashion different from pre-effective 
date systems. 
It is also not clear that the Fourth Circuit's decision 
follows directly from the legislative history. The court below 
relied primarily on various statements from the legislative 
history indicating that Title VII was not intended to undermine 
"established" or "existing" seniority rights. See 110 Cong. Rec. 
7213 (1964) (Memorandum of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case); id., at 7207 
(Justice Department comments). The Fourth Circuit was correct 
that Title VII in general, and §703(h) in particular, evidence a 
concern that seniority rights already vested at the time of the 
effective date of Title VII should be protected. But it does not 
necessarily follow from this observation that §703 (h) was not 
intended to protect subsequently-imposed seniority systems. 
Reading such negative implications into the legislative history 
is a speculative enterprise given the lack of any limiting 
language in the statute itself. As presently advised, I am not 
prepared to say that the legislative history constitutes a 
"clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary" of the 
statute's otherwise clear language. See Consumer Products Safety 
Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 u.s. 102, 108 (1980). 
Nor is the reading given §703 (h) by the court of Appeals 
obviously consistent with the Court's prior constructions of that 
Section. In Teamsters, the Court stated that "the unmistakable 
.. -4-
purpose of §703(h) was to make clear that the routine ·application 
of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title 
VII." 431 U.S., at 352. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, 432 u.s. 63, 82 (1977) (~703 (h) provides that "absent a 
discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system 
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has 
some discriminatory consequences"). The Court has also noted 
that Title VII was passed "against the backdrop of this Nation's 
longstanding labor policy of leaving to the chosen 
representatives of employers and employees the freedom through 
collective bargaining to establish conditions of employment 
applicable to a particular business or industrial environment." 
California Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 
(1980). While none of these cases considered the exact question 
at issue in this case, and thus do not necessarily require a 
result contrary to the decision below, it is equally true that 
the Court has never suggested that the effective date of Title 
VII makes any difference in terms of the applicability of 
§703 (h) 0 
Finally, while the Fourth Circuit's decision is in accord with 
the present position of tpe Equal Employment Opportunity 
"') 
Commission,2 it is i~conflict w~ th decisions of other Courts of 
Appeals that have routinely applied Teamsters to post-Act 
2 See EEOC Notice, No. N-915 (,.uly 14, 1977) (EEOC's 
position is that "a seniority system is protected under 
Section 703(h) only if it was instituted prior to the 
effective date of Title VII"). 
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imposition or revision of seniority systems. See, ~, 
Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 436 u.s. 946 (1978); Hameed v. International 
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 
637 F. 2d 506, 516 (CAS 1980) . 
Given the above concerns and the obvious importance of the 
issue presented with respect to the validity of all recently 
adopted seniority systems, an issue which will necessarily recur 
time and again, I would issue the writ of certiorari. 
( 
Preliminary Memo 
April 17, 1981 Conference 
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1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue t hat the CA4 improperly refused to 
apply §703(h) of Title VII, as construed in Internationa l :...-;;..... ______ ....,..........__________ --
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Uni : ed States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977), 
to a seniority system imposed a f t~r the operative date of Title 
--------~~~---------· ..... --------...__....._ 
VII. 1~ -.--.. I rtc f, r-Jed .{:. d..- ny-' ..-f+/..,_.-.~f-.t I J~ 
...f j 1 , ,-1 k.. dA:...f. .,t. he cA.-~ ,.,.vteJ ti:,. d l ~c ...e.:.5 ~ t-n . 




2. FACTS: In 1973, resp EEOC filed an employment 
c=-;-
discrimination case charging that petrs' promotion and seniority 
practices had confined blacks and women to low-paying jobs, in 
violation of Title VII. The case was consolidated with a private 
Title VII class action case filed by resp Patterson. In 1974, 
the district court entered a declaratory judgment finding that 
the employment practices violated Title VII. Specifically, the 
court found that until 1963 jobs at petrs' two plants were ____..., 
overtly segregated on the basis of race and sex. Covert 
~-----------~ --~ 
segregation continued well after the express segregation was 
---------~ 
discontinued. In 1968, petrs instituted a posting and bidding 
system whicn established six "lines of progression." Each line 
of progression required that an employee work in a lower level 
job in that line before advancing to the next level job in the 
same line. The district court concluded that the "lines of 
progression" perpetuated past discrimination and were not 
justified as a business necessity. 
On appeal, the CA4 affirmed the DC's findings, and with 
minor modifications upheld the injunctive relief. The case was 
remanded for individual back pay proceedings. This Court denied 
certiorari, 429 u.s. 920 (1976). 
While pending on remand, petrs moved to vacate the judgment 
on the basis of the Court's decision in Teamsters; United States 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553 (1977); and Hazelwood 
School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The DC ~~ 
denied the motion, finding that the seniority system was not a 
~-~~-~-
bona fide system under Teamster s "because this system operated 
'--- --- ~ 
( 
right up to the day of trial in a discriminatory manner ... 
~ [and] had a discriminatory genesis." 
A panel of the CA4 affirmed, finding that the employment -- - .., 
practice did not fall within the scope of §703(h) of Title VII, 
which provides that: 
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to apply different standards of 
compensation, or different terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
senio:r::_i ty system, .• . . provraea that such -
diffeienC:es are not the result of an intention to 
discriminate because of race [or] sex." 
The court remanded, however, for further findings with respect to 
the bona fide nature of another practice challenged by resps, 
namely the validity of a policy controlling interplant transfers 
between petrs' two plants. 
v"" 
3. DECISION BELOW: On rehearing en bane, a plurality 
the CA4 held that §703(h) had no applicability to the lines ...__ - ..... ------ ................. progression policy, even assuming it was a seniority system, '------- _............._ __ , _.. 
of 
of 
because the legislative history of the provision "conclusively 
demonstrates that Congress intended the immunity accorded 
seniority systems by §703(h) to run only to those systems in 
existence at the time of Title VII's effective date, and ... to 
routine post-Act applications of such systems." See Franks v. -- -...__-~·_.......,.,...- . ~__....-...-------
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Team~ter~. The 
legislative history is "replete with indications that the 
interests sought to be protected by this special exception to 
Title VII's general coverage of all 'conditions of employment' 
were those seniority rights already vested in incumbent workers 






§703(h) has no applicability to seniority systems not in 
operation at the effective date of Title VII. EEOC Notice N-915 
(July 14, 1977). Moreover, a memo prepared by Senators Clark and 
Case at the time of enactment stated that §703(h) was intended to 
assure that Title VII had no effect on establi s hed seniority 
rights. 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). Accordingly, the district 
court properly assessed the discriminatory effect of lines of 
progression policy under Griggs v. Duke Powe r Co., 401 U.S. 424 
l2. 
(1971). The plurality then rached other contentions not .. 
presented before this Court, and ordered a remand on the question 
whether petrs' inter-branch transfer rule violated Title VII. 
Judge Winter, joined by Judge Butzner, concurred in the 
result on the basis of the panel opinion. Judge Winter disagreed 
that a remand to consider the effects of Hazelwood School 
District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), on the propriety 
of the inter-branch transfer rule was required. 
Judge Widener, joined by Judge Russell, dissented on the 
ground that the record indicated that the lines of progression 
policy were instituted before the effective date of the Act, and 
thus the holding that §703(h) does not apply to post-Act 
seniority systems is irrelevant. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Pet r argues that the decision below is 
inconsistent with numerous Supreme Court cases construing 
§703(h). Last Term, in California Brewers Association v. Bry~nt, 
444 U.S. 598 (1980), the Court held that the term "seniority 
system" should be broadly construed in light of Title VII's 
recognition of the long-standing labor policy recognizing the 
; ' 
r~ importance of seniority systems. The uncertainty concerning 
( 
post-Act seniority systems raised by the decision below should be 
resolved. The result below requires that post-Act seniority 
systems meet the Griggs test, which is far harsher than the 
purpose test required in Teamsters. The difference in treatment 
between post-Act and pre-Act seniority systems is illogical in 
that otherwise bona fide seniority plans which discriminate only 
in effect will be found to violate Title VII, if instituted after 
1965, but not if created before. This will work to the 
disadvantage of blacks who may benefit from affirmative action 
programs which will be suspect under the majority's strict 
reading of §703(h). 
Petr argues that the decision below is plainly inconsistent 
with the express language of §703(h}, as well as being contrary 
to its legislative history. If Congress has meant to limit 
S703(h) 's effect, it easily could have done so in plainer 
language. The legislative history relied on by the majority is 
not persuasive of the effect of post-Act seniority systems. The 
decision below conflicts with the Court's construction of §703(h) 
in Teamsters, Evans, and •rwA. In TWA, the Court noted that 
Griggs was not meant to apply to seniority systems, 432 u.s. at 
82-83 n. 13 ("absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a 
seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even 
if the system has some discriminatory consequences"). Petrs also 
allege that the decision below conflicts with Alexander v. Aero 
Lodge, 565 F'.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 u.s. 946 




(8th Cir. 1980), where the courts inquired whether seniority 
systems were bona fide, and not whether they met Grigg's 
requirements. Petrs also cite a number of allegedly conflicting 
district court cases. 
Resp EEOC argues that cert should be denied given the 
limited nature of petr's argument. Under Federal Rule 60 (b) (5), 
a district court has broad discretion to decide ·whether to reopen 
a prior judgment to avoid extreme hardship or unfairness. See, 
~._g., Browder v. Director, 434 u.s. 257, 263 n. 7 (1978). Even 
assuming that §703(h) applies, petrs are not entitled to relief 
under Rule 60 (b) (5), since bona fide requires that a system "not 
have its genesis in racial discrimination [and that has been] 
negotiated . and maintained free from any illegal purpose." 
Teamsters, 431 u.s. at 356. Here, the record demonstrates that 
the lines of progression had their origin in overt discriminatory 
practices and were part of various policies designed to limit 
blacks and women to lower paying jobs. The DC properly concluded 
that the lines of progression were not bona fide seniority 
systems. 
Moreover, the CA4 correctly held that §703(h) affords no 
immunity to post-Act creation of the lines of progression, even 
assuming that the practice was a seniority system. On its face, 
§703(h) neither defines bona fide nor purports to sanction post-
Act establishment of seniority 3ystems that unlawfully "operate 
to 'freeze' the status quo of p r ior discriminatory practices." 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (1971). The emphasis in Teamsters is on 






systems, 431 u.s. at 352 (§703(h) was a congressional compromise 
designed to resolve "ambiguities concern[ing] Title VII's impact 
on existing collectively bargaining seniority rights ... [by] 
allow[ing] for full exercise of seniority accumulated before the 
effective date of the Act."). See· Evans, 431 U.S. 557-558; 
Franks, 424 u.s. at 759-761. No case cited by petr has squarely 
presented the question whether §703(h) was meant to limit 
judicial scrutiny of post-Act seniority systems, and thus no 
conflict exists. 
Resp workers argue that the decision below is not 
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court precedent, since the case 
law has expressly held that the purpose of §703(h) is to protect 
pre-Act bona fide seniority systems, even if they act to 
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. Without this provision, all 
of these seniority systems would be invalid. Clearly, this only 
goes to protect pre-Act plans and, as the majority recognized, 
any routine applications of those plans. The logic of §703(h) 
cannot be stretched to immunize totally new seniority plans from 
normal scrutiny under Title VII. None of the cases relied on by 
petrs concern the same issue as presented here. The decision 
below is also supported by the alternative ground that the lines 
of progression systems was not a seniority system. The original 
panel decision was based on that ground, and it was encompassed 
in the opinion of Judge Butzner, joined in by Judge Winter. The 
three-judge majority also recog n ized that there was · considerable 
support for this view, but determined not to reach the issue 




that the case is not ripe for review in light of the extensive 
remand ordered by the CA4 on back pay issues and other matters 
relative to Teamsters with respect to other union practices. 
5. DISCUSSION: I agree with the SG that review is 
unwarranted in this case. The allegedly inconsistent Supreme 
Court cases are clearly distinguishable in that they have 
uniformly considered pre-Act seniority systems. Certainly the 
distinction between pre-Act and post-Act actions is significant, 
,.--________ --- - --
and it is not at all illogical to suggest separate treatment for 
seniority systems depending on when they were enacted. The 
entire thrust of Title VII is to make a rather bright line 
distinction between events occurring before the effective date of 
the Act, and those occurring after the date. The majority's 
decision effectuates that underlying philosophy. Nothing in the 
statutory language of §703(h) demands that the usual Griggs 
analysis be discarded. Bona fide does not inherently require 
application of a purpose test, and the peculiar legislative 
history does suggest that the primary focus of Congress was on 
considering the effect of pre-Act seniority systems . 
. In any event, this case is not a good factual vehicle for 
considering the question since, as the SG points out, there is 
ample evidence that the seniority system imposed was not bona 
fide and was intentionally put into effect to continue petrs' 
discriminatory practices. While the en bane court did not rely 
on this logic, the DC did make this finding (as did . the original 
panel), and the SG is not foreclosed from relying on the argument 






consider the legal issue in a case where the proof of 
discrimination had been ~ore clearly based on a disparate impact 
Griggs analysis. 
On balance, I would deny. 
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Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent from denial of 
certiorari. 
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Mr. Justice White 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED srfl'1fE~1ated: _..,__s _J::;...;:;,UN_l_SB_l 
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY E'r AL. v. JOHN 
p A TTERSOX BT AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE; UNITED S'I'A'l'ES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOH THE J<'OUH'I'H CIRCUIT 
No. 80-1190. Deeided June -, 1981 
JusTICE WHITE, with whom JusTICE PowELL and Jus'l'ICEJ 
REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Section 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h) , 
provides that: 
"NotwithstanJing any other provision of this sub-
chapter, it shall not Q.t an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to apply different standaras of comJwnsa-
tio~cnt terms. c"'OiiUitions. or privileges of em-
ployment pursuant to a bo.na fide seniority or merit 
system . . . . 12roviderfthat such differencc7' a~he 
;esult of an ~on to di~crimi1iatC' ' beeause of rac<:., 
color~ligion , sex, or nationalorigin, ... . " 
A plurality of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
sitting en bane, has construed the prokctions affordedby ~ 703 
(h) as not a )plying to any scniorit s stem institut,llil...after 
the effective date o ritle . The plurality based its holc!-
i 1g in par on its view that tl1C' legislative history of ~ 703 (h) 
was "replete with indications' ' which "conclusively demon-
strates that Congress intended thC' immunity accorded senior-
ity systRms by ~ 703 (h) to run ouly Lo those systems in 
existence at the time of Title VlJ's effective date, and of 
course to routine post-Act applications of such systems." 
Accordingly, the plurality held that post-Act seuiority systems 
should be assPssed ull(kr the test articulated in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co. , 401 r. S. 424 (1971), and not under the more 
relaxed standard announced in International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). for chal-
lenges to bona fide seniority systems adopted before the eft'ec-
1"'?~· f~'ve-
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tive date of Title VII. Since the particular seniority system 
at question in this part of the case had already been found 
to violate Griggs, the plurality held that a Title VII viola-
tion had been demonstrated with respect to the particular 
seniority system at issue.1 
In my view, the Fourth Circuit has decided an important 
question of federal law which this Court should review. First, 
nothing in the language of § 703 (h) supports the bright-line 
distmction ~bv the court beloW. On its face, § 703 (h) 
d"'lfecls that bona fide~eniority svstems can only be found 
to violate Title vn if they intentionallY discriminate on the 
basis of race, sex, or o tner statutorily prohibited bases. There 
is no indication in the text of the provision that Congress 
intended bona fide seniority systems imposed after the effec-
tive date of Title VII to be treated in a fashion different from 
pre-effertivc date systems. 
It is also not clear that the Fourth Circuit's decision follows 
directlv from the legislative history. The court below relied 
nrimarily on various stl'!tements from the legislative history 
indirating that Title VII was 11ot intended to undermine 
"established" or "existing" seniority rights. See 110 Cong. 
Rer. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Se11. Clark and Sen. 
Case): id., at 7207 (Justice Dep3rtment comments). The 
Fonrt!) Circuit was correct that Title VII in general. and 
~ 703 (h) in particular, evidence a com~ern that sellinrity 
rie:hts alrPRdv vestrd at the time of the effective date of Title 
VII shonlcl be probcted. But it does not necessarilv follow 
from this observation that § 703 (h) was not intended to pro-
t Thr origimd panel fouud that the ~rniorit~· sv~tew in que~tion was 
not "bona fide'' within thr mPaning of§ io::l (h). Sre Patterso11 \' . Arne?·i-
can Tobacco Co .. 586 F. 2d 300, 303 (CA4 1978). The ]Jiurality did not 
rr]y on thi~ gronnd. however , but instead based ih deci::;ion on the llOn-
:1l)j)]irabilitY of ~ 703 (h) to ::;enioritY ::;y:;tem~ (•JJactecl after the effective 
dnt<> of Titl<> YII. Similarly, tlH• Fourth Circuit specifically refused to 
bn~r its deri::;ion on respondents' argumpnt that thr specific sy~t em under 
rrn~iclrration was T'OI in fnd a seniority ~y~tPm within the meaning of 
§703 (h). 634 F. 2d, ut 749, n. 3. 
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teet subsequently-imposed senioirty systems. Reading such 
negative implications into the legislative history is a specula~ 
tive enterprise given the lack of any limiting language in the 
statute itself. As presently advised, I am not prepared to 
say that the legislative history constitutes a "clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to the contrary" of the statute's 
otherwise clear language. See Consumer Products Safety 
Commission v. GTE Sylva.nia, Inc., 447 lT. S. 102. 108 (1980). 
Nor is the reading given ~ 703 (h b the Court of Appeals 
obviously consistent wit t e Court's prior constructions of 
that Section . . IlVTea~ the Court stated that "the 
unmistakable purpose of § 703 (h) was to make clear that the 
routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not 
be unlawful under Title VII." 431 U. S .. at 352. See Trans 
·world Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 82 (1977) 
( § 703 (JifProviaes th at rrab;e;;t a discriminatory purpose, 
the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful 
employment practice even if the system has some discrimina-
tory consequences"). The Court has also noted that Title 
VII was passed "against the backdrop of this Nation's long-
standing labor policy of leaving to the chosen representatives 
of employers and employees the freedom through collective 
bargaining to establish conditions of employment applicable 
to a particular business or industrial environment." Cali-
fonLia Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598, 608 
(Hl80). While none of these cases considered the exact 
question at issue in this case, and thus do not necessarily 
require a result contrary to the decision below, it is equally 
true that the Court has never suggested that the effective 
date of Title VII makes any difference in terms of the appli-
cability of § 703 (h). 
Finally, while the F~rth Cj~uit's decision is in accord with 
the present position of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commision,2 it is in conflict with decisions of other ~rts . ._. ~ 
2 Sec EEOC Notice, No. N-915 (July 14, 1977) (EEOC'E po:,;ition is 
that "a Heniority Ry:stern iK protected under Scetion 703 (h) only if it was 
in~tituted prior to the effective date of Title VII"). 
4 AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON 
o~als that hav,e routinely applied Teamsters to post-Act 
imposition or revisiou of "'semonty systems. ~e. g., 
Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 73 , 565 . 2c 1364 (QA6)1977), 
cert. denied, 436 U. S. 946 (1978); Hameed v. International 
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron 
Workers, 637 F. 2d 506, 516 (CA8 80). 
Given the above concerns an the obvious importance of 
the issue presented with respect to the validity of all recently 
adopted seniority systems, an issue which will necessarily re-
eur time and again, I would issue the writ of certiorari. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell January 16, 1982 
From: Mary 
No. 80-1199, The American Tobacco Co., Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 
& Local 182 of Tobacco workers' Int'l Union 
v. John Patterson, et al. 
Question Presented 
Does §703(h) protect bona fide post-Civil Rights Act 







In 19~, petrs instituted (or modified) a posting and 
bidding system, which resulted in the six "lines of progression" 
2. 
now at issue in this case (three other lines of progression are not 
challenged here). Each line of progression required that an 
employee work in a lower level job in that line before advancing to 
the next level job in the same line. 
In 1973, resp EEOC filed an employment discrimination 
case challenging petrs' promotion and seniority practices on the 
ground that they e onfined blacks and women to low-paying jobs, 
-K-
i~violation of Title VII. The case was consolidated with a private 
Title VII class action filed by resp Patterson on the basis of 
administrative charges filed in 1969. 
In 1974, the DC entered a declaratory judgment, finding )r~ 
'I 
that six lines of progression and certain other employment practices 
violated Title VII. Specifically, the court found that until 1963, 
~
jobs at petrs' two plants wre overtly segregated on the basis of 
race and sex and that covert segregation continued well after the 
express segregation was discontinued. The DC concluded that the 
"lines of progression" perpetuated past discrimination and were not 
justified by busness necessity. At the time of these findings, the 
~ r~was that Title VII invalidated seniority systems that 
perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination regardless of -
motivation. 
On appeal, the CA4 affirmed the DC's findings, and, with <?~~ ---- 4ii ~ n minor modifications, upheld the injunctive relief. The case was -~rr~ 
remanded for individual back pay proceedings. This Court denied 
< • 
~· ... "~·· ... , 
3. 
cert, 429 u.s. 920 (1976). 
While pending on remand, the Court handed down 
-----------~ 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. u.s., 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
There, the Court held that §703(h) protects plans that perpetuate 
past discrimination provided they are not motivated by ---
discriminator The company and union moved for relief from 
the DC in light of Teamsters, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 
u.s. 553 (1977), and Hazelwood School District v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299 
(1977). The DC denied the motion on the merits, holding that the 
challenged system was not a bona fide plan under Teamsters because 
it "had a discriminatory genesis" and operated right up to the day 
of trial in a discriminatory manner. J.A. 110. 
The CA upheld the DC's findings with respect to the lines 
of progression at issue before this Court, but remanded on another 
issue, holding that more fact findings were needed regarding the 
bona fides of the use of length of time of branch service to measure 
progression were not bona fide; instead, it held that they were not ----
part of a seniority system; §703(h) was, therefore, inapplicable, 
·' I 
and the DC had applied the proper legal standard (disparate impact) 
in considering them. 
bane. 
The company and the union filed petns for rehearing en 
While these petns were pending,~alifornia Brewers Ass'n v. 
Bryant, 444 u.s. 598 (1980) came down. That case gave a broader 
reading to the term "seniority system" than that applied by the 
panel. - En bane, the CA41 ruled that §703(h) had no applicability ---- ------------------------------~ 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
~/J¥ ~ 'Jl>->t:t) 
· k~ 4. 
/'2..+1A-u ... ~~~ ~~~ ~ ~ 
to the lines of progression, even assumi~g 'ffia1- 1t was a seniority vi/ 
system, because the legislative history of the provision VI~ 
"conclusively demonstrates that Congress intended the immunit~
accorded seniority systems by §703(f) to run only to those systems 
in existence at the time of Title VII's effective date, and ••. to 
routine post-Act applications of such systems." The CA4 found the 
legislative history "replete with indications that the interests 
sought to be prot~cted by this special exception to Title VII's 
general coverage of all 'conditions of employment' were those 
seniority rights already vested in incumbent workers when Title VII 
went into effect." 
v/Judge Widener, joined by Judge Russell, dissented. Judge 
Widener doubted that the majority's holding was correct in limiting 
§703(h) protection to pre-Act seniority systems. He noted that 
( 
"§703(h) on its face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems" and 
~ that §703(h) is not written like a grandfather clause, though 
Congress undoubtedly knows how to write such clauses when it wishes. 
J.A. 160 n.l. Judge Widener focused, not on this point, but on the 
adequacy of the record supporting the majority's finding that the 
lines of progression were adopted in 1968. He noted that the DC had 
made no findings on the point and that the record evidence indicated 
that a much larger number of lines of progression (including these 
6) had existed in practice prior to the Act, though not expressly 
1 (Haynesworth, Winter, Butzner, Russell, Widener, Hall & 
Phillips) (Widener & Butzner dissenting from the majority's 
construction of §703(h). 
·. 
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defined in the collective bargaining agreement. In 1968, the 
parties substantially reduced the number of lines of progression, 
these 6 being among the 9 that survived. If these facts, all 
supported by record evidence of some kind, were true, he observed 
that the 1968 "change" only benefited black employees by reducing -
the number of jobs covered by the resrtictive lines of progression. 
He considered a remand necessary so that the DC could make initial 
f . d. th . t 2 1n 1ngs on ese po1n s. 
The en bane CA remanded for a hearing on, among other 
things, the bona fides of the rule that seniority was forfeited when 
an employee transferred between branches or divisions. These issues 
are not before the Court; cert was granted only on whether §703(h}1 
applies to pre-Act, not post-Act, seniority plans. 3 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Statute 
Section 703(h) provides: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
2The majority merely stated that the record contained 
enough evidence to support the conclusion that substantial 
changes or "formalizations" were made in 1968 "(whether in favor 
of or against employee interests) to consititute s new policy, or 
at least one so radically altered from prior unstructured 
procedures that it could not be considered simply a 'routine 
application,' ••• of those 1965 procedures." J.A. 143, n.4 
(citing Teamsters). 
3No other circuit has distinguished between pre-Act and 
post-Act plans in considering whether a plan violates Title VII. 
See cases collected in brief of Amer. Tobacco (blue) n.32, at 25 • 
... 
~· 
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a 
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production or to employees who work in different 
locations, prpvided that such differences are not the 
result of an q nt ention to discriminat~ because of race, 
color, relig1on, sex, or national origin •..• 
6. 
By its clear terms, the provision makes no discriminations in terms 
of time--it would seem to apply equally to all seniority plans, 
whether pre-Act or post-Act. 
B. Evidence Supporting the CA4 
~? "' The CA4 does not mention the 1 l anguage of the statute. The 
I 
~)CA4's analysis of whether §703(h} covers post-Act plans consists of 
~one 2-sentence paragraph in text and one footnote. See petn for 
cert at app. 9-10 & n.S at app. 10. In text, the Court states that 
the legislative history examined by this Court in Teamsters and 
Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976}, "conclusively demonstrates 
that Congress intended the immunity [of §703(h}] to run only to 
those systems in existence at the time of Title VII's effective 
date, and of course to routine post-Act applications of such 
systems." Petn app. 10. In support, t:J.ecA cites Teamsters, 431 
U.S., at 352, where the Court noted that §703(h} was designed to 
clarify that the Act "would not outlaw such differences in treatment 
among employees as flowed from a bona fide seniority system that 
allowed for full exercise of se~iority accumulated before the 
effective date of the Act." 
The CA4's textual discussion ends with the statement that 
the legislative history is "replete" with evidence that §703(h} was 
to protect seniority rights already vested at the time the Act 
7. 
became effect. A footnote supports this second assertion. Here, 
theCA relies on: (1) EEOC's position that §703(h) has no 
application to post-Act seniority systems (a position partially 
abandoned in the brief to this Court); (2) a memorandum prepared by 
Senators Clark and Case explaining that Tile VII would have no 
effect on established seniority rights; (3) a Justice Department 
statement that Title VII would have no effect on seniorty rights in 
existence on its effective date; (4) a statement in Teamsters, 431 
u.s., at 352, to the effect that Title VII would allow "full 
exercise of seniority accumulated before the effective date of the 
Act" (already cited in text after the first sentence); and (5) the 
fact that Title VII is a broad remedial statute. 
The sole support for the CA4's position, aside from the 
remedial nature of Title VII, 4 is the EEOC's position (now partially -abandoned) , the negative pregnant present in the assertion that 
Title VII andjor §703(h) would not interfere with seniority rights 
vested as of the Act's effective date (con~ined in 3 statements, 
one from Justice, one from an explanation prepared by two senators, 
and one in Teamsters). 
4The remedial-nature argument is no more than a statement 
of preference for Title VII pltfs over Title VII defts. If such 
a preference determines the scope of provisions Congress inserted 
to limit Title VII's impact, those limits will be eroded, if not 
eliminated. Because §703(h) is a provision limiting the scope of 
Title VII, Title VII's remedial nature should not be the 
overriding principle guiding its construction. 
8. 
C. The Evidence Opposing the CA4 
As Justice White pointed out in his dissent from denial in 
this case, which you joined, the evidence opposing the CA4's 
position is considerable. (Justices Stewart and Rehnquist also 
eventually voted to grant). 
1. Evidence in the legislative history. The union's brief 
(blue) 12-31 does an excellent job of marshalling the legislative ~S 
~ 
:::::::si:n::p:s::::: ::m:::Yc::·:h~:::~:n:m:::tt::se::::::: ~ 
discussed in that brief. ~~  
First, there is not one statement in all of Title VII's 
history stating that §703(h) does not protect post-Act plans. 
"Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary," 
the language of a statute "must ordinarily be regarded as 
• 1) 
conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 
u.s. 102, 108 (1980). 
Many statements not reported by the CA4 are inconsistent 
with its interpretation. For example, Senator Clark's intorductory 
remarks to the Clark-Case explanation include the statement that 
"the bill would not affect seniority at all." 110 Cong. Rec. 7207. 
Moreover, the discussion of "pre-Act" seniority systems was 
initiated by the bill's opponents prior to the addition of §703(h); 
dUring this pre-§703(h) period, they argued that Title VII would 
destroy even existing seniority rights. In contrast, the bill's 
proponents repeatedly focused their assurances on the fact that 
Title VII would not affect seniority plans. This aspect of the 
9. 
history is discussed in the union's brief (blue) at 14-23. 5 
The House passed the bill without §703(h), and it was 
introduced to the Senate in that form. After the speeches in 
support were completed, a filibuster began. To end the filibuster, 
the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute was introduced~ its amendments 
included §703(h). In making the major presentation of these 
changes, Senator Humphrey explained that §703(h) was not a 
substantive change, but only a clarification. 110 Cong. Rec. 12732. 
As noted in Amer. Tobacco's brief, Senator Dirksen thought 
that the amendment was probably the most meticulously drafted piece 
of legislation he had ever worked on, adding "We have tried to be 
mindful of every word, of every comma, and of the shading of every 
phrase." And Senator Dirksen's statements in J 
reference to seniority plans indicate that §703(h) protects all bona 
110 Cong. Rec. 11935. 
'------"' fide plans. See, e.g., id., 14331 ("Senate amendments permit and 
protect seniority, merit, and all incentive systems."). It cannot 
be doubted that Senator Dirksen knew how to draft a grandfather 
5see, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. 1518 (statement of 
Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
in presenting the bill on the House floor) ("It has been asserted 
also that the bill would destroy worker seniority systems and 
employee rights vis-a-vis the union and the employer. This again 
is wrong.")~ id., at 6566 (memorandum prepared by Rebublican 
sponsors in the-House describing bill as it passed the House) 
("Title VII ••• does not permit interferences with seniority 
rights of employees or union members.")~ id., at 5094 (during 
debate on whether bill should be referred to Committee, Senator 
Humphrey, co-manager, introduced newspaper article quoting the 
answers of a Justice Department "expert" to the "ten most common 
objections.") ("What is prohibited is the refusal to hire someone 
because of his race or religion. Similarly, the law will have no 
effect on union seniority rights."). For additional statements 
of Senator Humphrey, see brief of union (blue) at 16-17, 22-23. 
10. 
clause--and the conclusion that §703(h) means what it says seems 
inescapable. 
Moreover, as the union's brief (blue) notes at 28, Congress 
intended Title VII to be a "spur or catalyst" to broadening 
employment opportunities for minorities. Yet, if §703(h) is a 
grandfather clause protecting only pre-Act plans not changed or 
modified since the Act, it will operate (as the decision below ~ 
illustrates) as a disincentive to broaden (or change in any way) ~ 
seniority plans, even in order to ameliorate their effect on 
'---·---
minorities. 
2. Title VII and labor policy. This Court has recognized 
that Title VII in general, and §703(h) in particular, must be 
construed with the knowledge that Congress did not intend Title VII 
to intrude unnecessarily upon national labor policy: 
.. lies at the core of our 
o , and seniority provisions are 
included in these contracts. Without a clear 
and express indication from Congress, we cannot agree ... 
that an agreed-upon seniority system must give way ••. " 
TWA v. Hardison, 432 u.s. 63, 79 (1981). 
And in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 u.s. 598, 606 (1980), 
the Court stated: 
"Congess passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the 
backdrop of this Nation's longstanding labo5_policy of 
leaving to the chosen representatives of empoyers and 
employees the freedom through collective bargaining to 
establish conditions of employment applicable to a 
particular business or industrial environment. See 
generally Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 u.s. 193. It does 
not behoove a court to second guess either that process or 
its products •.... Seniority systems, reflecting as they 
do, not only the give and take of free colletive 
bargaining, but also the specific characteristics of a 
particular business or industry, inevitably come in all 
sizes and shapes ..•.• As we made clear in the Teamsters 
case, seniority may be "measured in a number of ways" and 
the legislative history fo §703(h) does not suggest that 
it was enacted to prefer any particular variety of 
senioriy system over any other." (citations omitted). 
2. Evidence in the prior decisions of this Court 
11. 
construing §703(h). Although the CA4 found one "negative pregnant" 
in Teamsters, the decision below is consistent with neither 
Teamsters nor the other decisions of this Court construing §703(h). 
Although these cases did not directly address whether §703(h) is 
only a grandfather clause, their discussions suggest that §703 is 
generally applicable regardless of the date on which a plan 
originated. 
In Teamsters, the Court stated that Congress intend to 
protect many kinds of seniority plans, noting that "[t]hen, as now, 
seniority was measured in a number of ways." 431 U.S., at 355 n.41. 
In~ted Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the 
Court upheld a seniority system that perpetuated the effect of post-
Act discriminaton. The Court rejected the "narrow" construction of 
§703(h) adopted by theCA: 
"This reading of §703(h) is too narrow. The statute does 
not foreclose attacks on the current operation of 
seniority systems which are subject to challenge as 
discriminatory, But such a challenge to a neutral system 
may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event 
which has no present legal significance has affected the 
calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event 
might at one time have jusitified a valid claim against 
the employer." Id., at 560. 
In Evans, the Court also noted that "§703(h) unequivocally mandates 
that there is no statutory violation in the absence of a showing of 
discriminatory purpose." Id., at 559-560. 
And in TWA v. Hardison, 432 u.s. 63 (1977), the Court 
.• 
12. 
emphasized, without differentiating between pre-Act and post-Act 
practices, that "seniority systems are afforded special treatment 
under Title VII itself. Id., at 81. I 
~~~~' 
D. The SG's Position ~ ~ 
The SG urges a novel and rather strange interpretation of 
§703(h). Section 703(h) states that it is not unlawful 
(notwithstanding any other provision of Title VII) for an employer 
"to apply different standards of compensation," etc., "pursuant to a 
bona fide seniority plan." And §703(a) (2) makes it illegal for an 
employer "to limit .•• or classify his employees in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employement 
opportunities or otherwise adverselly affect his status as an 
employee because of such individual's race." The SG concludes that 
§703(h) only "immunizes" 6 application of a bona fide plan, but an 
employer's adoption of such a plan is not "immunized" by §703(h) if 
the plan has an adverse impact on minorities--and it is therefore 
illegal under §703 (a) (2). 
Thus, in the case at bar, presuming the challenged plan was 
bona fide but had a discriminatory impact, it was illegal for the 
employer to agree to the lines of progression in 1968, but it was 
6The use of the word "immunize" to refer to the effect of 
§703(h) on plans under it is not entirely appropriate. Section 
703(h) does not immunize plans--it provides that plans that are 
bona fide and that are not intended to discriminate do not 
violate Title VII. A plan is not, however, "immune" if it is 
adopted to discriminate. Thus, construing §703(h) as applying to 
post-Act as well as pre-Act plans will not "immunize" 
intentionally-discriminatory plans. 
,..,. ' 
'.· . .; ~ 
.· 
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not illegal to make employment decisions pursuant to that plan 
thereafter. 
There are several problems with this approach. A threshold 
problem is that the SG urges affirmance of the court below in the 
absence of any finding of a timely charge under the SG's theory. 
Under that theory, a seniority plan is "immunized" by §703(h) once 
it is adopted and the relevant period for filing a timely charge 
passes without any charge being filed. The SG apparently concedes 
that the EEOC's charge and the sex-discrimination charge are time-
bar red. See reply brief of Amer. Tobacco (yellow) at 13-14. (The 
relevant limit for filing charges was then 90 days.) The charges 
underlying the Patterson class action (for racial discrimination) 
were filed in Jan. and Feb. of 1969. Id. The SG's timeliness 
argument is made in n.6 at 5 of the SG's brief. There, the SG notes 
that the challenged "'lines of progression ••• were finally set up 
at a meeting in November 1968 •.• '" (quoting trial transcript, 
statement of Mr. Truitt). The only relevant finding by a lower 
court, however, is theCA's: "This policy was not in effect ••. in 
1965 when Title VII went into effect, but was only adopted in 
January 1968 •.•. " Petn app. 9. If the lines of progression were 
adopted Jan., 1968, rather than Nov., 1968, then the Patterson 
charges (filed in Jan. & Feb., 1969) were untimely (more than 90 
days). Even if the Court were to adopt the SG's theory, it would 
have to vacate or remand on the timeliness question. 
There are less-technical reason~ SGs' approach should 
be rejected. First, the legislative history, discussed above, 
.1'< ---. 
indicates that Congress meant to clarify Title VII (not implement a 
• > 
14. 
substantive change) when it adopted §703(h). The clarification was 
to show that Title VII would not interfere with bona fide seniority 
plans. Yet the SG asserts that Congress only meant to protect bona 
fide plans from charges filed more than 90 days (now 180 days) after 
the plan's adoption. 
Second, the SG's reading of the statutory language is 
strained; it rests on a negative pregnant found withi~the purely 
cauctionary language of §703(h). Section 703(h) provides that 
(notwithstanding other provisions) certain employment actions 
(pursuant to bona fide plans) are legal; it does not proscribe any 
conduct nor does it purport to provide an exhaustive list of the 
kinds of employment actions that are legal under Title VII. Thus, 
the fact that an action pursuant to a bona fide plan is expressly 
stated to be legal does not, in the context of a clarifying proviso 
such as §703(h), mean that the adoption of the plan is illegal. If 
anything, it suggests that such the adoption of such a plan is not 
be the type of "clasification" or "limitation" §703(a) (2) was 
designed to proscribe. In this context, it should be noted that the 
words used in §703(h) to describe seniority plans are quite 
different from the words used to describe the conduct prohibited by 
§703(a) (2). 7 
7section 703(a) (2) makes it illegal to "limit, segregate, 
or classify ..• employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 
Section 703(h) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to apply different standards of 
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
•" .... 
15. 
Third, the SG turns §703{h) into what is essentially a 
special statute of limitations for seniority plans. Yet Congress 
did not use wording in any way similar to the other provisions of 
Title VII dealing with time limits. 
Finally, if the SG is right, and the adoption of seniority 
plans by employers are proscribed by §703{a) {2) because that act is 
not expressly included within §703{h), then the adoption of §703{h) 
was not a clarification but a major substantive change from what 
Congress had previously intended, and the proponents of the Act were 
repeatedly dishonest in asserting, both before and after the 
addition of §703{h), that Title VII would not interfere with 
seniority systems under collective bargaining agreements. 
On balance, it is most unlikely that Congress meant 
§703{a) {2) to outlaw the adoption of the kinds of things regarded as 
seniority plans under §703{h). 
CONCLUSION 
In reaching the decision below, the CA4 relied heavily on a 
negative pregnant in three statements {one in an explanation 
prepared by two senators, one in a memorandum prepared by Justice, 
and one in Teamsters), to the effect that Title VII was not intended 
to destroy seniority rights already vested at the time of its 
emloyment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a 
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production or to employees who work in different locations, 
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention 
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin •••• " 
16. 
enactment. But nowhere in the legislative history is there support 
for concluding that the Congress meant to limit the protection of 
§703(h) to seniority plans then in effect--indeed, the legislative 
history provides overwhelming support for the proposition that 
§703(h) means what it says and applies to all seniority plans, 
regardless of date of adoption. The decisions of this Court 
discussing §703(h) and the decisions of other courts also support 
the plain language of the statute. 
The CA4's decision was supported by the EEOC's position, ~ 
but that position has now been abandoned. The SG maintains that -----------___;;o.----.. ________ _ 
§703(h) protects only actions taken pursuant to bona fide plans, but 
that an employer's adoption of such plans is not protected by 
§703(h) and is prohibited by §703(a) (2). Section~ 5,G~7 
therefore, simply a statute of limitations 
plan is not filed within 90 days of its adoption, the 
protected by §703(h). If Congress intented to create a special 
statute of limitations when it enacted §703(h), it certainly 
/1 - ,, 
in an unusually oblique way. Moreover, this 
construction is neither demanded by the statutory language (§703(h) 
proscribes nothing and is not an exhaustive list of legal employment 
proctices) nor consistent with the legislative history, which 
reveals that the supporters of Title VII repeatedly assured 
opponents, both before and after the adoption of §703(h), that Title 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1199 
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, ET AL., PETITION-
ERS v. JOHN PATTERSON, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE, FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1982] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), a 
prima facie violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h), "may be estab-
lished by policies or practices that are neutral on their face 
and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect 
against a particular group." Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U. S. 324, 349 (1977). A seniority system "would seem 
to fall under the Griggs rationale" if it were not for § 703(h) of 
the Civil Rights Act. Ibid. That section provides in perti-
nent part: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-
ter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit sys-
tem, . . . provided that such differences are not the 
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give 
and to act upon the results of any professionally devel-
oped ability test provided that such test, its administra-
tion or action upon the results is not designed, intended 
a_;~-
~ 
• 1 cpist 
-.: no 
'-' J4 uor 
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or used to discriminate because race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin .... " 
Under § 703(h), the fact that a seniority system has a dis-
criminatory impact is not alone sufficient to invalidate the 
system; actual intent to discriminate must be proved. The 
Court of Appeals in this case, however, held that § 703(h) 
does not apply to seniority systems adopted after the effec-
tive date of the Civil Rights Act. 1 We granted the petition 
for certiorari to address the validity of this construction of 
the section. -- U. S. --. 
I 
Petitioner American Tobacco Company operates two 
plants in Richmond, Virginia, one which manufactures ciga-
rettes and one which manufactures pipe tobacco. Each plant 
is divided into a prefabrication department, which blends and 
prepares tobacco for further processing, and a fabrication de-
partment, which manufactures the final product. Petitioner 
Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers' International 
Union and its affiliate Local 182 are the exclusive collective 
bargaining agents for hourly-paid production workers at both 
plants. 
It is uncontested that prior to 1963 the company and the 
union engaged in overt race discrimination. The union main-
tained two segregated locals, and black employees were as-
signed to jobs in the lower paying prefabrication depart-
ments. Higher paying jobs in the fabrication departments 
were largely reserved for white employees. An employee 
could transfer from one of the predominately black prefab-
rication departments to one of the predominately white fab-
rication departments only by forfeiting his seniority. 
In 1963, under pressure from government procurement 
agencies enforcing the antidiscrimination obligations of gov-
ernment contractors, the company abolished departmental 
'Title VII became effective July 2, 1965, one year after its enactment. 
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seniority in favor of plant-wide seniority and the black union 
local was merged into the white local. However, promotions 
were no longer based solely on seniority but rather on senior-
ity plus certain qualifications, and employees lost accumu-
lated seniority in the event of a transfer between plants. 
Between 1963 and 1968, when this promotions policy was in 
force, virtually all vacancies in the fabrication departments 
were filled by white employees due to the discretion vested in 
supervisors to determine wl}p- was qualified. 
In November 1968 the 'Company proposed the establish-
ment of 9 linys- of progression, 6 of which are at issue in this 
case. The union accepted and ratified the lines of progres-
sion in 1969. Each line of progression consisted of two jobs; 
an employee was not eligible for the top job in the line until 
he had worked in the bottom job. Four of the six lines of 
progression at issue here consisted of nearly all-white top 
jobs from the fabrication departments linked with nearly all-
white bottom jobs from the fabrication departments; the 
other two consisted of all-black top jobs from the prefabrica-
tion departments linked with all-black bottom jobs from the 
prefabrication departments. The top jobs in the white lines 
of progression were among the best-paying jobs in the plants. 
On January 3, 1969 respondent Patterson and two other 
black employees filed charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission alleging that petitioners had dis-
criminated against them on the basis of race. The EEOC 
found reasonable cause to believe that petitioners' seniority, 
wage, and job classification practices violated Title VII. 
After conciliation efforts failed, the employees filed a class 
action in District Court in 1973 charging petitioners with ra-
cial discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1981. Their suit was consolidated for trial with a subse-
quent Title VII action filed by the EEOC alleging both race 
and sex discrimination. Following trial, the District Court 
held that petitioners' seniority, promotion, and job classifica-
tion practices violated Title VII. The court found that 6 of 
80-1199-0PINION 
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the 9 lines of progression were not justified by business ne-
cessity and "perpetuted past discrimination on the basis of 
sex and race." App. 32. The court enjoined the company 
and the union from further use of lines of progression. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and re-
manded for further proceedings with respect to remedy, 535 
F. 2d 257 (1976), and we denied a petition for certiorari. 429 
u. s. 920 (1976). 
On remand petitioners moved to vacate the District 
Court's 1974 orders and to dismiss the complaints on the 
basis of this Court's decision in Teamsters v. United States, 
supra, which held that § 703(h) insulates bona fide seniority 
systems from attack even though they may have discrimina-
tory impact on minorities. The District Court denied the 
motions, holding that petitioners' seniority system "is not a 
bona fide system under Teamsters ... because it operated 
right up to the day of trial in a discriminatory manner." 
App. 110. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed 
that "Teamsters requires no modification of the relief we ap-
proved with regard to . . . lines of progression," because they 
were not part of a seniority system within the meaning of 
§ 703(h). 568 F. 2d 300, 303 (1978). 
The Court of Appeals reheard the case en bane. It did not I 
decide whether the lines of progression were part of a senior-
ity system. Instead, it held that even if the lines of progres-
sion were considered -art o f a semon y sy~ess 
intenaea--tlie Immunity accor e semority systems y 
§ 703'(ll)t'6f'!:llf0l11Yto t ose sys ems m existence at the time 
of Title VI s ef ec Ive ate, an o c e o rou me post-Act 
appl~ems." 634 F. 2d 744, 749 (1980). 2 
We reverse. 
' The en bane court remanded the case to the District Court for addi-
tional proceedings to determine whether the plantwide seniority system in 
effect since 1963 is a bona fide seniority system within the contemplation of 
§ 703(h). See 634 F. 2d 744, 750. This issue is not before the Court. 
80-1199-0PINION 
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON 5 
II 
Petitioners argue that the plain language of § 703(h) applies 
to post-Act as well as pre-Act seniority systems. The re-
spondent employees claim that the provision "provides a nar-
row exemption [from the ordinary discriminatory impact 
test] which was specifically designed to protect bona fide se-
niority systems which were in existence before the effective 
date of Title VII." Brief for Respondents Patterson, et al. 
29. ResEon?e~ E{~ supports the judgment below, but 
urges us to mterpre 03(h) so as to protect the post-Act 
application of a bona fide seniority system but not the post-
Act adoption of a seniority system or an aspect of a seniority 
system. 
As in all cases involving statutory construction, "our start-
ing point must be the language employed by Congress," 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979), and we 
assume "that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used." Richards v. United 
States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962). Thus "[a]bsent a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U. S. 102, 108 (1980). The plain language of§ 703(h) is par-
ticularly cogent in light of the circumstances of its drafting. 
It was part of the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise substitute 
bill which represented "not merely weeks, but months of 
labor." 110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirk-
sen). As Senator Dirksen explained, "I doubt very much 
whether in my whole legislative lifetime any measure has re-
ceived so much meticulous attention. We have tried to be 
mindful of every word, of every comma, and of the shading of 
every phrase." Ibid. 
On its face § 703(h). makes no distinction between pre- and 
post-Act seniority systems, just as it does not distinguish be-
tween pre- and post-Act merit systems or pre- and post-Act 
80-1199-0PINION 
6 AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON 
ability tests. The section employs the ~sent tense and the ) 
~nse, i. e. "shall not be" and "to apply,' w 1c indi-
cates that it applies prospectively. It does not take the form 
of a savings clause or a grandfather clause designed to ex-
clude existing practices from the operation of a new rule. 
Other sections of Title VII enacted by the same Congress 
contain grandfather clauses, see § 703(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-(e), which increases our reluctance to 
transform a provision that we have previously described as 
"defining what is and is not an illegal discriminatory prac-
tice,'' Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 
761 (1976), from a definitional clause into a grandfather 
clause. 
The EEOC's position receives little support from the statu-
tory language permitting an employer to "apply" different 
standards of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or 
merit system. The application of different standards must, 
by the terms of the statute, be pursuant to a seniority or 
merit system; the system and its application are thus inex-
tricably interwoven. Furthermore, it makes little sense to 
distinguish adoption from application ~itle 
VII c allenge to a semont system. he adoption of a se-
niOrity system w 1ch as not een "applied" or put into oper-
ation would not give rise to a cause of action, for it would re-
sult in discrimination only if it were to be put into operation 
or if that event were sufficiently likely, in which case it would 
be odd not to judge the matter based on the validity of the 
factor that creates the cause of action, i. e., the application of 
the system. An adequate remedy for adopting a discrimina-
tory seniority system would very likely include an injunction 
against the future application of the system and backpay 
awards for those harmed by its application. However, such 
an injunction would lie only if the requirements of § 703(h)-
that such application be intentionally discriminatory-were 
satisfied. 
Under the EEOC's interpretation of the statute, plaintiffs 
who file a timely challenge to the adoption of a seniority sys-
80-1199-0PINION 
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tern arguably would prevail in a Title VII action if they could 
prove that the system would have a discriminatory impact 
even if it was not purposefully discriminatory. See Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., supra. On the other hand, employees who 
seek redress under Title VII more than 180 3 days after the 
adoption of a seniority system-for example, all persons 
whose employment begins more than 180 days after an em-
ployer adopts a seniority system-would have to prove the 
system was intentionally discriminatory. 4 Yet employees 
who prevailed by showing that a bona fide seniority system 
had a discriminatory impact although not adopted with dis-
criminatory intent would not be entitled to an injunction for-
bidding the application of system: § 703(h) plainly allows the 
application of such a seniority system. ( 
A further result of the EEOC's theory would be to discour- ~ 
age unions and employers from modifying pre-Act seniority 
systems or post-Act systems whose adoption was not timely 
challenged. Any modification, if timely challenged, would 
be subject to the Griggs standard-even if it benefited per-
sons covered by Title VII-thereby creating an incentive to 
retain existing systems which enjoy the protection of 
§ 703(h). 5 
3 Prior to 1972, Title VII generally required charges to be filed within 90 
days of an alleged discriminatory practice. Section 706(e), 78 Stat. 260, 
was added in 1972. It now requires aggrieved persons to file a charge 
"within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice occurred." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). 
• The facts of this case give rise to just such an anomaly under the 
EEOC theory. The respondent employees filed race discrimination 
charges within 90 days of the adoption of the lines of progression but sex 
discrimination charges were filed more than 90 days after the adoption. 
Under the EEOC theory, the lines of progresion would be analyzed under 
two different tests: the Griggs impact test and the § 703(h) intentional 
discrimination test. 
5 "Significant freedom must be afforded employers and unions to create 
differing seniority systems." California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 
U. S. 598, 608 (1980). Petitioners' interpretation of § 703(h) would im-
pinge on that freedom by discouraging modification of existing seniority 
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Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinc-
tions and unreasonable results whenever possible. The 
EEOC's reading of § 703(h) would make it illegal to adopt, 
and in practice to apply, seniority systems that fall within the 
class of systems protected by the provision. We must, 
therefore, reject such a reading. 
III 
Although the plain language of § 703(h) makes no distinc-
tion between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems, the 
court below found support for its distinction between the two 
in the legislative history. Such an intepretation misreads 
the legislative history. 
We have not been informed of and have not found a single 
statement anywhere in the legislative history saying that 
§ 703(h) does not protect seniority systems adopted or modi-
fied after the effective date of Title VII. Nor does the legis-
lative history reveal that Congress intended to distinguish 
between adoption and application of a bona fide seniority sys-
tem. The most which can be said for the legislative history 
of § 703(h) is that it is inconclusive with respect to the issue 
presented in this case. 
As we have previously described, see Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation Co., supra, at 759-761, the initial bill 6 
passed by the House of Representatives on February 10, 
1964 did not contain § 703(h) and neither the bill nor the ma-
jority Judiciary Committee Report 7 even mentioned senior-
ity. However, the House Minority Report warned that the 
bill, if enacted, would destroy seniority. H. Rep. No. 914, 
88th Gong. 1st Sess. 64-65 (1963). Following a 17-day de-
bate over whether the bill should be referred to committee, 
the Senate voted to reject the motion to refer it to committee 
systems or adoption of new systems. 
6 H.R. 7152 
7 H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
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and began to formally consider the merits of the bill on March 
30, 1964. Meanwhile, a bipartisan group led by Senators 
Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey, and Kuchel worked to reach 
agreement on amendments to the House bill which would en-
sure its passage. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 445 (1966). The Mansfield-
Dirksen compromise, which contained § 703(h), was intro-
duced on the Senate floor in the form of a substitute bill on 
May 24, 1964.8 Prior to the introduction of the Mansfield-
Dirksen substitute, supporters of the House bill responded to 
charges that it would destroy existing seniority rights. 9 On 
April 8, 1964 Senator Clark made a speech in which he con-
cluded that "the bill will not affect seniority at all." llO 
Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964). In support of his conclusion, he in-
serted three documents into the Congressional Record which 
this Court has characterized as "authoritative indicators" of 
the purpose of§ 703(h), 10 Teamsters v. United States, supra, 
at 352 (1977), and which the court below relied upon for its 
conclusion that post-Act seniority systems were not intended 
to be protected by§ 703(h). See 634 F. 2d at 749-750, n. 5. 
The first document was a Justice Department memoran-
dum which stated, in part, that "Title VII would have no ef-
fect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect." 11 
8 110 Cong. Rec. 11926, 11931 (1964). 
'For examples of charges that the bill would destroy existing seniority 
rights see, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-66 (1963) 
(Minority Report); 110 Cong. Rec. 486--489 (1964) (Remarks of Sen. Hill); 
110 Cong. Rec. 11741 (1964) (Remarks of Sen. Javits discussing charges 
made by Governor Wallace). 
'
0 Senator Humphrey, one of the drafters of the Mansfield-Dirksen sub-
stitute, explained that § 703(h) did not alter the meaning of Title VII but 
"merely clarifie[d] its present intent and effect. 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 
(1964). Therefore statements made prior to the introduction of§ 703(h) by 
proponents of Title VII are evidence of the meaning of § 703(h). 
11 110 Cong. Rec. 7207. The full text of the statement with respect to 
seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747, 760 n. 16 (1976). 
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The second document was an interpretive memorandum 
which had been prepared by Senator Clark and Senator 
Case, and it also said Title VII would "have no effect on es-
tablished seniority rights." 12 Senator Clark also introduced 
written answers to questions propounded by Senator Dirksen 
which included the statement, "Seniority rights are in no way 
affected by the bill." 13 
On the basis of the statements that Title VII would not af-
fect "existing'' and "established" seniority rights, petitioners 
infer that Title VII would affect seniority rights which were 
not "established" or "existing'' when the Act became effec-
tive. Such an inference is unjustified. While the materials 
which Senator Clark inserted into the Congressional Record 
did speak in terms of Title VII not affecting "vested," "exist-
ing," or "established" seniority rights, they did so because 
they were responding to a specific charge made by the bill's 
opponents, namely that the bill would destroy existing se-
niority rights. Had Senator Clark intended the bill not pro-
tect post-Act seniority systems, it is highly unlikely he would 
have stated on the floor of the Senate that "the bill would not 
affect seniority at all," 14 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964), or intro-
duced a written response to a question posed by Senator 
Dirksen which said: 
"Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill if 
under a 'last hired, first fired' agreement, a Negro hap-
12 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). The full text of the statement with re-
spect to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
supra, at 759 n. 15. 
13 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964). The questions and answers with respect 
to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 
supra, 760-761 n. 16. 
14 Strictly speaking, Senator Clark's statement that Title VII would not 
affect seniority is incorrect. Title VII does affect seniority rights, for 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, allows awards of retroac-
tive seniority to victims of unlawful discrimination. However, Senator 
Clark's technical error does not alter our conclusion that he and other key 
proponents of the bill intended that it have minimal impact on seniority 
systems. 
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pens to be the 'last hired,' he can still be 'first fired' so 
long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired' and 
not because of his race." I d., at 7217. 
Petitioners' argument also ignores numerous other refer-
ences to seniority by proponents of Title VII which were 
couched in terms of "seniority" rather than "existing senior-
ity rights." See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5423 (1964) (remarks 
of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6554 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); 
id., at 6665-6666 (memorandum prepared by House Republi-
can sponsors); id., at 11768 (remarks of Sen. McGovern). In 
addition, the few references to seniority after § 703(h) was 
added to the bill are to the effect that "the Senate substitute 
bill expressly protects valid seniority systems." I d., at 
14329 (letter from Senator Dicksen to Senator Williams). 
See also id., at 14331 (remarks of Senator Williams). 
Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a 
possibly contrary Congresional intent is "a step to be taken 
cautiously" even under the best of circumstances. Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 26 (1977). "[I]n light of 
its unusual legislative history and the absence of the usual 
legislative materials," Franks v. Bowman Construction Co., 
supra, at 761, we would in any event hesitate to give dispos-
itive weight to the legislative history of § 703(h). More im-
portantly, however, the history of§ 703(h) does not support 
the far-reaching limitation on the terms of§ 703(h) announced 
by the court below and urged by petitioners. The fragments 
of legislative history cited by petitioners, regardless of how 
liberally they are constructed, do not amount to a "clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent contrary the plain language of the 
statute." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE 
Sylvania, supra, at 108. 
IV 
Our prior decisions have emphasized that "seniority sys-
tems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself," 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 81 
(1977), and have refused to narrow § 703(h) by reading into it 
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limitations not contained in the statutory language. In 
Teamsters v. United States, supra, we held that§ 703(h) ex-
empts from Title VII the disparate impact of a bona fide se-
niority system even if the differential treatment is the result 
of an intent to discriminate on racial grounds. Similarly, by 
holding that "[a] discriminatory act which is not made the 
basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discrimi-
natory act which occurred before the statute was passed," 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558 (1977), 
the Court interpreted § 703(h) to immunize seniority systems 
which perpetuate post-Act discrimination. Thus taken to-
gether, Teamsters and Evans stand for the proposition 
stated in Teamsters that "[s]ection 703(h) on its face immu-
nizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not distinguish 
between the perpetuation of pre- and post-Act" discrimina-
tory impact. Teamsters, supra, at 348 n. 30 (emphasis 
added). 15 Section 703(h) makes no distinction between se-
niority system adopted before its effective date and those 
' 5 Nowhere in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), does the 
Court indicate when the seniority system at issue there was adopted, and 
examination of the record illustrates the difficulty of fixing an adoption 
date. Article V of the National Motor Freight Agreement of 1964 contains 
a seniority provision subject to modification by area agreements and local 
union riders. See Brief for Petitioner Teamsters 24-25. However, Na-
·tional Motor Freight Agreements are of 3-year duration, and the 1970 
Agreement was in effect when the complaint was filed. If a seniority sys-
tem ceases to exist when the collective bargaining agreement which cre-
ates it lapses, then the seniority system in Teamsters was adopted post-
Title VII. On the other hand, if in practice the seniority system was 
continuously in effect from 1964, it can be argued that its adoption pre-
dates Title VII. However, Teamsters places no importance on the date 
the seniority system was adopted, and we follow Teamsters by refusing to 
distinguish among seniority systems based on date of adoption. Given the 
difficulty of determining when one seniority system ends and another be-
gins and the lack of legislative guidance, we think it highly unlikely Con-
gress intended for courts to distinguish between pre-Act and post-Act se-
niority systems. 
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adopted after its effective date. Consistent with our prior 
decisions, we decline petitioners' invitation to read such a dis-
tinction into the statute. 
Seniority provisions are of "overriding importance" in col-
lective bargaining, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 346 
(1964), and they "are universally included in these con-
tracts." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 
79. See also Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and 
Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 
1534 (1962). The collective bargaining process "lies at the 
core of our national labor policy .... " Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 79. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. 
§ 151. Congress was well aware in 1964 that the overall pur-
pose of Title VII, to eliminate discrimination i:n employment, 
inevitably would, on occasion, conflict with the policy favor-
ing minimal supervision by courts and other governmental 
agencies over the substantive terms of collective bargaining 
agreements. California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 
598, 606 (1980). Section 703(h) represents the balance Con-
gress struck between the two policies, and it is not this 
Court's function to upset that balance. 
Because a construction of § 703(h) limiting its application to 
seniority systems in place prior to the effective date of the 
statute would be contrary to its plain language, inconsistent 
with our prior cases, and would run counter to the national 
labor policy, we vacate the judgment below and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 16 
So ordered. 
"All parties agree that on remand the court should decide whether the 
lines of progression are part of a seniority system, and if so, whether they 
are bona fide within the meaning of§ 703(h). We decline to reach those 
issues because, as the court below noted, their resolution requires addi-
tional factual development. See 634 F . 2d 744, 749 n. 3. 
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